











































Citation for published version:
Hopewell, K 2016, 'The accidental agro-power: Constructing comparative advantage in Brazil' New Political
Economy. DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2016.1161014
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1080/13563467.2016.1161014
Link:






This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in New Political Economy on
23/3/2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/12345678.1234.123456.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.





The Accidental Agro-Power: 




Lecturer in International Political Economy  
University of Edinburgh 
15a George Square 





Abstract:  Brazil has emerged as an agro-export powerhouse:  from being a net-agricultural 
importer and food aid recipient as recently as the 1960s and 1970s, it has now become the 
world’s third largest agricultural exporter, after the US and EU.  What is more, Brazil’s new role 
as a major agricultural trader has provided an important foundation for its enhanced status and 
influence in global economic governance, as an emerging power and one of the BRICS.  This 
paper analyzes how such a remarkable transformation was brought about.  I argue that Brazil’s 
emergence as an agricultural powerhouse was the result not of its natural factor endowments, but 
extensive intervention on the part of the Brazilian state that had the effect of constructing a new 
comparative advantage.  This transformation was propelled by state-driven innovation and 
related policies that opened up massive new areas of the country to agriculture, enabled it to shift 
to producing goods in direct competition with the world’s dominant agricultural exporters, and 
generated significant gains in productivity and competitiveness.  The irony is that the intention of 
these policies, initiated in the 1970s, was to foster industrial development in Brazil as part of its 
import-substitution industrialization program, yet they wound up having precisely the opposite 
effect – transforming Brazil into one of the world’s dominant agricultural powers. 
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Introduction 
Since the 1970s, Brazil has been transformed from a net-agricultural importer into an 
agro-export powerhouse.  It is now one of the largest and most competitive agricultural 
producers in the world and a serious threat to the global market dominance of the world’s leading 
agricultural exporters, the US and EU.  The rapid expansion of its agribusiness exports has 
contributed to fostering macroeconomic stability, fueling high rates of economic growth and 
boosting government revenues, which have, in turn, made possible redistributive policies that 
have produced significant gains in reducing poverty and inequality (Ioris Forthcoming; Spolador 
and Roe 2013).   
Brazil’s emergence as a major agricultural trader has also contributed to its status as an 
emerging power and enabled it to secure a more prominent role in global governance (Armijo 
and Burges 2010; Hurrell 2010).  Brazil’s rise has been most striking at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), where it joined the elite inner-circle of decision-making and played a 
central role in the Doha Round (Grant 2007; Hopewell 2013; Mahrenbach 2013).  Propelled by 
the rise of its agro-export sector, Brazil emerged as a vocal advocate of agricultural trade 
liberalization, winning two landmark trade disputes against the US and EU and leading a major 
developing country coalition, the G20, in challenging rich country subsidies (Clapp 2006; 
Narlikar and Tussie 2004).  Brazil’s activism was ground-breaking and had profound 
implications:  by turning the tables and seizing the offensive vis-à-vis the traditional powers, it 
helped bring an end to the longstanding dominance of the US and EU and put their trade policies 
at the center of the Doha Round (Hopewell 2015).   
Beyond the WTO, Brazil secured a seat in the G20 Leader’s Summit, comprised of the 
major developed and developing economies, when it replaced the G8 as the primary forum for 
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international economic cooperation (Cooper 2010; Schirm 2013).  Brazil is a founding member 
of the BRICS Forum, as well as the New Development Bank, an alternative and rival to the 
Western-dominated World Bank (Chin 2014).  Brazil has also played a prominent role in the 
international climate change negotiations (Hochstetler and Viola 2012).  And, in a further sign of 
its clout, Brazilian officials have been chosen to head key international organizations:  José 
Graziano da Silva, the architect of Brazil’s Zero Hunger program, was elected Director-General 
of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization in 2012 and Roberto Azevêdo, previously Brazil’s 
Ambassador and Chief Negotiator, was appointed WTO Director-General in 2013. 
This paper analyzes the transformation of Brazilian agriculture that has propelled its rise 
as an agricultural power.  I argue that Brazil’s agribusiness boom was the result not of natural but 
constructed comparative advantage.  Extensive state intervention played a fundamental role in 
altering Brazil’s position in the global economy and turning it into a world-leading agricultural 
exporter.  Brazil’s experience thus defies the assumptions of traditional models of development 
in the global political economy:  contrary to the principles of neoliberalism, Brazil’s comparative 
advantage has been successfully reshaped as the result of active intervention by the Brazilian 
state; yet, contrary to the principles of developmental state theory, this move has been in the 
direction not of industry but agriculture.  Specifically, this has involved the construction of a new 
comparative advantage, not in the tropical products typically exported by developing countries, 
but in the bulk crops and livestock that made temperate developed countries the world’s 
dominant agricultural powers.   
The reason that state intervention was critical to the development of Brazilian 
agribusiness is that, contrary to what has become the conventional wisdom, Brazil was not 
naturally suited to becoming a major agricultural exporter.  With one of the largest supplies of 
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land in the world, Brazil’s natural factor endowments would appear highly conducive to 
agricultural production.  But, in fact, due to the nature of its tropical soil and climate, much of 
this land was inhospitable for agriculture.  It took extensive state intervention to transform the 
country’s massive endowment of land into an effective resource for commercial agriculture.  
Brazil’s natural factor endowments alone were insufficient.  Instead, Brazil’s emergence as an 
agricultural powerhouse was propelled by state-driven innovation and related policies that 
transformed a large part of the country that was previously considered an agricultural wasteland 
into one of the most productive agricultural regions in the world, made it possible to grow 
temperate crops in its tropical climate, and dramatically increased the efficiency and 
competitiveness of Brazilian agriculture.   
Ironically, however, I show that Brazil’s transformation into an agro-power was an 
accidental outcome of policies intended to have precisely the opposite effect – specifically, it 
originated in a set of policies born in the 1970s as part of a project of import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI) intended to move Brazil away from dependence on agricultural exports 
and foster the industrialization of its economy.  The argument presented here thus departs from 
conventional accounts of Brazil’s agribusiness boom, which is most often heralded as the result 
of its economic reforms and liberalization.  This example from an article in Foreign Affairs is 
typical:  “the secret of Brazil’s current success,” it asserts, lies in its “market-friendly economic 
policies” (De Onis 2008: 110).  While acknowledging the role of technological innovation and 
(private) investment, the article makes no mention of the state’s involvement or the fact that its 
key policies and investments stemmed from the ISI era.  Instead, it presents a highly selective 
reading of Brazil’s recent economic history that serves to confirm the dominant market-oriented 
economic paradigm, within which ISI is commonly dismissed as a failure (Buscaglia and Long 
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1997; Shafaeddin 2012), precisely due to its purported inability to generate technological 
advance and competitiveness (Meyer-Stamer 2005).  Indeed, among mainstream economists, ISI 
is effectively “seen as a four-letter word” (Vernengo 2012).  In contrast to the prevailing view, 
however, I contend that, in fact, Brazil’s agribusiness boom had unexpected roots in its earlier 
ISI project.   
Comparative Advantage, Agriculture and Development in the Global Political Economy 
The issue of comparative advantage lies at the center of longstanding debates in 
international political economy regarding the relationship between trade and development.  As 
the prevailing economic paradigm since the 1980s, neoliberalism has preached with near-
religious zeal the power of free markets to bring efficiency, growth and prosperity (Blyth 2002).  
Rooted in the trade theory of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, at the heart of economic 
liberalism is the theory of comparative advantage, which states that a country will maximize its 
economic welfare by specializing in producing and exporting goods in which it has a relative 
advantage compared to other states (Ho 2010).  In other words, a country should trade based on 
its natural factor endowments and inherent comparative advantage.  Any state intervention to try 
to alter a country’s comparative advantage would only be counter-productive, creating 
inefficiencies that impede growth (Bhagwati 2004).  According to the “Washington Consensus” 
propagated by the multilateral economic institutions, the solution to underdevelopment was for 
countries to liberalize and open their economies, remove state intervention and “free” markets to 
facilitate the efficient movement of goods and capital (McMichael 2012).1  
1 Neoliberalism nonetheless embodies significant contradictions (Peck 2010, Schmidt and Thatcher 2013).  Rather 
than being genuinely non-interventionist, neoliberalism has in practice involved not deregulation but re-regulation – 




                                                 
Notwithstanding moderate tinkering, this neoliberal perspective remains largely intact as 
the dominant view of trade and development; as Robert Wade (2010: 159) states, “no alternative 
policy paradigm to neoliberalism has yet attracted wide support.”  When confronted with the 
East Asian miracle, for example, which confounded the expectations of laissez-faire, the World 
Bank acknowledged the role of selective state intervention, but nonetheless maintained that the 
success of the Asian tigers was primarily due to “market friendly” policies and that, if industrial 
policy worked, it was only because firms were subject to competitive disciplines that mimicked 
those of the market (World Bank 1993).  Retaining a deep skepticism towards the state, 
mainstream economic beliefs continue to have at their core “the proposition that ‘government 
failure is generally worse than market failure’, which supports the default policy setting of ‘more 
free market’ in most countries most of the time” (Wade 2010). 
In contrast to the neoliberal orthodoxy, developmental state theory offers a markedly 
different diagnosis of the causes of, and prescription for, underdevelopment.  It challenges the 
fundamental premise of liberal trade theory:  that countries should trade based on their natural 
factor endowments and resulting comparative advantage.  Critical approaches (such as 
structuralism, dependency theory, and world systems theory) contend that the prospects for poor 
countries to develop are blocked by their dependence on primary product exports at 
comparatively low and highly volatile prices, which, combined with their reliance on imports of 
higher-value manufactured goods from advanced-industrialized states, locks developing 
countries into a system of unequal exchange (Ho 2010).  With the export of commodities 
identified as a barrier to economic prosperity and manufacturing viewed as the cornerstone of 
development (Gereffi 1989), it is argued that underdeveloped countries need to industrialize in 
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order to be released from “the straitjacket of agrarian, pastoral, and mining production” (Cardoso 
2009: 297).   
Developmental state theory thus advocates a highly interventionist state to foster import 
substitution or export-oriented industrialization (Heller, Rueschemeyer and Snyder 2009).  This 
includes, for example, the selective use of trade and investment restrictions and/or incentives to 
foster new industries and encourage technology transfer and industrial upgrading.  The ISI 
variant of the developmental state is credited with the successful industrialization achieved by 
some developing countries, especially in Latin America, during the 1950s-1970s, while the 
export-oriented variant propelled the rapid growth of the East Asian newly industrialized 
countries (NICs), such as Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, in the 1960s-80s (Amsden 
1989; Evans 1979; Wade 1990).  The notion of constructed comparative advantage at the heart 
of developmental state theory maintains that states can and should purposefully work to shape 
their international specialization; the role of the developmental state is to actively reengineer a 
country’s comparative advantage from the production of primary products to higher-value 
manufactured goods.   
Although theories of trade have grown increasingly complex, incorporating additional 
dynamics beyond differences in factor endowments and comparative advantage – including 
economies of scale, firm agglomeration and inter-firm production networks (Gereffi 1999; 
Krugman 1996) – these still remain central to contemporary debates about trade and 
development in the global political economy.  Most recently, comparative advantage has been at 
core of debates surrounding the “new structural economics” launched by Justin Lin when Chief 
Economist of the World Bank.  In a departure from the original Washington Consensus, Lin 
argues that industrial upgrading and technological advance are critical for economic 
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development but will not happen through market forces alone and require state intervention.  Lin 
contends that development is best promoted by a “facilitating state” – “a state that facilitates the 
private sector’s ability to exploit the country’s comparative advantage,” by subsidizing 
innovation and investing in human capital, infrastructure, and financial and legal institutions (Lin 
and Chang 2009: 484).  Yet, according to Lin, “the key is to make use of the country’s current 
comparative advantage” – he rejects the notion that the state has a role to play in creating 
comparative advantage, arguing that “comparative-advantage-defying” approaches are costly and 
counterproductive and likely to produce “sickly infant industries that never mature” (Lin and 
Chang 2009: 484, 487).  Critics, however, contest the claim that a developing country can catch 
up with the more advanced economies by following the dictates of its existing endowment 
structure and comparative advantage (Fine and Van Waeyenberge 2013; Wade 2010).  As Ha-
Joon Chang argues, it is necessary “to defy comparative advantage if a country is going to enter 
new industries and upgrade its industrial structure” (Lin and Chang 2009: 492). 
Broadly speaking, perspectives on trade and development thus remain split between, on 
one pole, the view that a country should embrace its existing comparative advantage and 
specialize in exporting products where it is naturally competitive due to its factor endowments 
and, on the other, the view that a highly interventionist state is needed to transform a country’s 
comparative advantage and foster the development of manufacturing industries.  In the analysis 
that follows, I show that Brazil’s path of state-sponsored agricultural development departs from 
the principles and expectations of both perspectives.  Brazil did not emerge as an agro-export 
powerhouse by relying simply on its natural factor endowments and the magic of the market.  
Instead, it needed state intervention to construct its comparative advantage, which has, in turn, 
provided the foundation for its new economic and political clout on the international stage. 
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Occurring alongside and shaped by real-world policy developments in Brazil and 
elsewhere, a new strand of development thinking – “neodevelopmentalism” – has emerged since 
the 2000s.  If the Washington Consensus and developmentalism are ideal types that constitute 
the extreme ends of the “liberal-statist policy spectrum,” neodevelopmentalism is a hybrid that 
falls somewhere in the middle (Ban 2012: 302).  Neodevelopmentalism combines neoliberal 
macroeconomic policies and export-oriented growth with renewed emphasis on industrial policy 
and redistributive measures (Morais and Saad-Filho 2012).  There is no manifest consensus 
among neodevelopmentalists on whether industrial policy should be comparative advantage 
conforming or comparative advantage defying, and Cornell Ban (2012) shows that Brazil’s 
contemporary strategy combines elements of both.  Crucially, though, Brazil’s recent 
neodevelopmentalism has been significantly buttressed and enabled by the strong performance of 
its agribusiness sector.  While the economic turmoil of the 1980s and early-1990s (debt crisis, 
acute recession, hyperinflation, capital flight) created an unfavorable climate that undermined the 
Brazilian state’s ability to effectively pursue developmental policy goals, it was only with more 
favorable economic conditions in the 2000s that the state was able to pursue a strategy of 
“renewed developmentalism” with an ever-growing range of industrial policies to enhance 
competitiveness and innovation priorities (Hochstetler and Montero 2013).  Through its 
substantial contribution to macroeconomic stability, economic growth and fiscal revenues, the 
massive expansion of agribusiness exports thus played a critical role in providing the foundation 
for Brazil’s neodevelopmentalist model (Spolador and Roe 2013).  By the time of its 
neodevelopmentalist turn, Brazil did indeed have an “inherited” comparative advantage in 
industrial agriculture; but, as I will demonstrate, this was new and the direct result of earlier state 
interventions.  If “the BRICs’ reassertion of the role of the state in development is one of the 
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most consequential events of the global economy” (Ban and Blyth 2013: 250), then 
understanding the origins of Brazil’s agribusiness expansion sheds important light on the 
historical underpinning of its contemporary development model. 
In most development thinking, agriculture has taken a backseat to industry:  with 
industrialization seen as synonymous with development, agricultural modernization has been 
viewed primarily as a foundation for industrial growth (De Janvry 2010).  It is widely 
acknowledged that, for many successful developers, improving the productivity of agriculture 
has been an important part of their industrialization process and the state has played a central role 
in propelling agricultural transformation.  The Asian NICs, for example, pursued policies of 
agricultural modernization to successfully generate rapid productivity and output growth in 
agriculture, thereby increasing food supply, releasing labor to industry and boosting rural 
incomes to foster social stability and support for the national development project (Burmeister 
1990; Francks, Boestel and Kim 1999; Kohli 1999; World Bank 1993).  As the World Bank 
(1993: 32) indicates: 
East Asian governments have actively supported agricultural research and extension 
services to speed diffusion of Green Revolution technologies. Their substantial 
investments in irrigation and other rural infrastructure hastened adoption of high-yielding 
varieties, new crops, and the use of manufactured inputs, such as fertilizer and 
equipment, to cultivate them.  
 
Importantly, though, in such countries, agriculture was harnessed to support, and subordinated 
to, the national industrialization project (Burmeister 1990).2  While there has thus been 
recognition of the importance of state intervention in agriculture to the process of development, 
2 Scholars have also highlighted development linkages between the agricultural and industrial sectors:  
improvements in agriculture can promote growth of manufacturing industry through spillover effects (Burmeister 
1990) and measures to boost manufacturing output can likewise contribute to productivity increases in agriculture 
(Wade 2010).   
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this has been seen primarily as a means to foster rapid growth of the manufacturing sector and its 
exports, rather than as a vector of export-led growth in itself. 
With agriculture viewed as a backwards sector, a core premise of existing theory is that 
development requires moving from the production of agricultural and other commodities to 
manufactured goods.  As Harriet Friedmann (1994: 261) states, “the ideology of development 
[has] focused, to the point of obsession, on industrialization.”  Yet, as I will show, over time, 
agriculture itself has become highly industrialized, capital-intensive and – particularly with 
recent growing global demand and food scarcity – lucrative.  This has been connected to other 
changes in the international division of labor.  It is no longer simply the case that the Global 
South produces and exports primary products and the Global North manufactured goods (Frobel, 
Heinrichs and Kreye 1981).  On the contrary, even by the 1980s, the Global South had come to 
export more manufactured goods than primary products, and the Global North exported 
considerably more primary products than the Global South (Harris 1987).  Between 1950 and 
1980, the developing world’s share of world agricultural exports dropped dramatically, from 53 
to 31 percent (Grigg 1993: 251).  At the same time, the US and Europe dramatically expanded 
their share of global production and consolidated their positions as the world’s dominant 
agricultural exporters, through an enormous increase in their agricultural productivity fueled by 
technological advance and a protective trade policy regime of tariff and subsidies (Wolfe 1998).  
Within the new international division of labor that has emerged over the last several decades, 
capital-intensive production and the production of intellectual property are concentrated in the 
developed world, while the developing world has come to be associated with low-skilled, labor-
intensive production, whether in traditional agriculture or manufacturing.   
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As I demonstrate, the dominant form of agriculture that has now emerged in Brazil (as 
well as other major exporters like the US, Europe, Canada and Australia) is industrialized 
agriculture, capital-intensive and technologically-sophisticated.  It is “high-tech” agriculture, 
employing advanced machinery and production methods, engineered seeds and chemicals, and 
large economies of scale.  The expansion of Brazilian agribusiness has involved a substantial 
increase in capital stock (Rada and Valdes 2012).  In fact, agriculture is now the most capital 
intensive sector in the Brazilian economy – more so than either manufacturing or services – and 
Brazilian agriculture is relatively more capital-intensive than any other country, including the US 
(Spolador and Roe 2013).  Consequently, it could be argued that industrialized agriculture in 
Brazil has more in common with industrial manufacturing than traditional peasant or plantation 
agriculture, and in this respect conforms to the expectations of neostatism about the underlying 
source of development being capital-formation.   
Moreover, in the contemporary global economy, the new marker of development is no 
longer the presence of manufacturing industry but what Alice Amsden (2001) calls “knowledge-
based assets” – research and development-fueled knowledge, technology, and intellectual 
property.  Ha-Joon Chang likewise argues that it is their “technological capabilities” – the 
differential ability to develop and use technologies – that distinguish developed from developing 
countries (Lin and Chang 2009: 490).  It is precisely such knowledge-based assets that have been 
the basis of Brazil’s agriculture boom, which has been technology-driven and, importantly, based 
on domestic innovation.  While in an earlier period of dependent development, Brazil’s industrial 
development (like that of other semi-peripheral countries) was heavily dependent on foreign 
technology (Evans 1979), its recent emergence as an agro-power has been driven by indigenous 
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technological development.  Indeed, Brazil is now even exporting its advanced agricultural 
technology and know-how to other countries.   
Importantly, Brazil has used technological innovation specifically to construct a new 
comparative advantage in temperate agricultural products.  Previously, the production of 
temperate commodities was heavily concentrated in rich countries and tropical commodities in 
poor countries.  Tropical climates are unfavorable for intensive cultivation of staple crops and 
livestock (Gallup and Sachs 2000), and the world’s top agricultural exporters were therefore rich 
countries – twenty years ago, the world’s top 10 food exporters did not include a single 
developing country (World Bank 2013: 2).  Furthermore, global market conditions have differed 
significantly for temperate versus tropical products:  tropical agricultural products have 
experienced stronger and steeper long-term deterioration of prices than temperate agricultural 
products, as well as greater volatility (Erten and Ocampo 2013; Jomo and von Arnim 2012; 
Lewis 1969).  This distinction is shaped by labor market dynamics, with the excess supply of 
labor in tropical agriculture exerting downward pressure on prices for tropical products, and the 
fact that “countries that produce tropical goods compete with other poor countries at the 
international level in markets involving very little value-added” (Bértola and Ocampo 2012: 88).  
Growth in the tropical agricultural products typically exported by developing countries – such as 
coffee, cocoa and tea – has also  been held back by sluggish and saturated demand in developed 
markets (FAO 2002: 25).  In contrast, Brazil has successfully moved into the production of 
temperate products, incorporating greater value-added and benefiting from more buoyant 
demand conditions (Poulton 2008).  Key areas of Brazil’s agriculture expansion – such as meat 
and animal feed – have experienced rapidly and continuously expanding demand propelled by 
growing incomes and protein consumption across the developing world.  Meat, for instance, is a 
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high-value product because it is relatively capital-intensive and expensive to produce (Elliott 
2006) and livestock production relies heavily on the availability of large quantities of low-cost 
feed grains, such as soy and corn – which, until Brazil’s agriculture transformation, were 
temperate products.  Defying the constraints of its climate, Brazil has thus used state-led 
innovation to become the first tropical country to join the ranks of the world’s leading 
agricultural producers, while also using its enhanced productivity in bulk commodity production 
to fuel the expansion of higher-value, downstream agro-processing industries (such as feed/meat 
and sugarcane/ethanol) (Poulton 2008). 
Background:  A Brief History of Agriculture in the Brazilian Economy & Policy 
Like many developing countries, the export of agricultural commodities has long played 
a role in Brazil’s economic history, dating back to the colonial era.  Into the early decades of the 
twentieth century, the Brazilian economy centered on the export of coffee and other commodities 
such as rubber to markets in Europe and the US.  It was a situation of classic dependency, with 
Brazil reliant on the export of cheap primary products and the import of more expensive 
manufactured goods (Cardoso 1972).  Concerned about its dependence on primary product 
exports in the context of declining terms of trade, Brazil embarked upon import-substitution 
industrialization beginning in the 1930s and accelerating in the 1950s-70s (Evans 1979).  
Economic policy during this period emphasized the subordination of agriculture to industrial 
development.  Due to the success of its ISI policies, over much of the twentieth century, the 
importance of agriculture in the national economy declined as that of manufacturing increased 
and Brazil was transformed from an agrarian to a major industrial economy (Weyland 1998).  
Brazilian agriculture consisted primarily of large plantations producing tropical products for 
export, small family farms supplying the domestic market, and peasants engaged in subsistence 
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production.  As recently as the 1970s, Brazil was a net-agricultural importer and, until the 1960s, 
it systematically received food donations from abroad (Martha, Contini and Alves 2013). 
The international debt crisis of the early 1980s plunged Brazil into an economic crisis, 
faced with major balance of payments problems, soaring inflation, and an inability to meet its 
international debt obligations.  Policymakers determined that the old model of an inward-looking 
economy with substantial state intervention to promote industrial development was no longer 
sustainable.  Over the 1980s and 1990s, Brazil introduced a major program of economic reform 
and liberalization, involving aggressive inflation fighting to stabilize the macroeconomic 
environment, the elimination of foreign trade restrictions and barriers to foreign investment, and 
reducing state intervention in markets.  In agriculture, reforms included privatizing state 
enterprises, reducing subsidies, and eliminating government purchases, marketing boards and 
minimum support prices.  As I will show, liberalization had an explosive effect on the growth of 
Brazil’s agribusiness sector and its exports.  But this was not simply a story of the triumph of 
neoliberal economic reforms, unleashing the market and prompting a flourishing of private 
enterprise.  On the contrary, the foundation for Brazil’s transformation into an export 
powerhouse was laid a decade earlier in the 1970s, with a set of state policies that played a 
crucial role in constructing Brazil’s new comparative advantage in agriculture. 
The Making of an Agro-Export Powerhouse 
Brazil’s emergence as an agro-power has its origins in policies and investments put in 
place by the state at the height of its ISI program during the 1970s.  At that time, the primary 
goal of the Brazilian state was boosting the country’s position in the international division of 
labor by fostering the development of its manufacturing industries.  Paradoxically, the 
transformation of Brazilian agriculture was instigated by its industrialization drive.  The 
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Brazilian state launched an ambitious effort to modernize Brazil’s stagnant agricultural sector 
and increase production, in the service of its industrialization project.  Crucially, enhancing the 
agriculture sector was seen as a means to an end – continued industrial development – not an end 
in itself.  The state had two primary goals.  One, rapid urbanization associated with 
industrialization had created a food supply crisis, manifest in high prices for basic foodstuffs 
(creating demands for higher wages from urban workers), long lines in supermarkets, and social 
unrest (Alves 2010).  The food supply shortage threatened to derail industrialization.  Seeking to 
maintain social stability and the country’s high growth rates, the military government was eager 
to increase the supply of food and alleviate upwards pressure on domestic prices.  Two, the state 
also sought to diversify and expand agricultural exports in order to generate foreign exchange to 
finance imports of technology and capital goods necessary to continue the process of 
industrialization (Contini and Martha 2010).  This was particularly attractive due to high global 
agricultural prices at the time.  The state-led initiatives that ultimately spurred the transformation 
of Brazil’s agriculture sector were thus undertaken with the objective of increasing agriculture 
production as a means to fuel its ISI project, by providing cheap food for the domestic market 
and foreign exchange revenues from export earnings.  State policies did indeed wind up altering 
the nature of Brazil’s role in the global economy, but the direction of the economic 
transformation the state initiated was exactly the reverse of the one it intended:  a set of policies 
launched to support the country’s industrial development eventually helped to transform it into 
one of the world’s dominant agricultural powers.  Agriculture, which was given a supporting role 
during Brazil’s import substitution industrialization, ultimately came to steal the show. 
The effort to modernize Brazilian agriculture centered on research and development, 
backed by subsidized credit and agricultural extension services to facilitate the diffusion of new 
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technologies.  At the hub of this strategic initiative was the creation of a new federal research 
institute, the Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural Research (EMBRAPA), in 1973.  EMBRAPA 
was charged with constructing a large research infrastructure of laboratory and other facilities, 
supported by substantial investments in research and development and advanced scientific 
training and capacity building (Contini and Martha 2010).  By the late 1970s, EMBRAPA had 
nearly 1000 researchers, including agronomists and veterinary personnel specializing in plant 
production, genetic improvement, soil science and phytopathology, and biotechnology 
(Wilkinson and Sorj 1992).  In addition to conducting its own direct R&D, EMBRAPA 
coordinated nationwide agricultural research through the Brazilian Agricultural Research 
System, encompassing state agricultural research organizations, universities and its own research 
operations (Martha, Contini and Alves 2013).   
It was the stream of scientific and technological innovations eventually produced by 
EMBRAPA that propelled the development of Brazil’s contemporary agro-industrial export 
sector.  Initially, EMBRAPA’s work centered on adapting technologies developed elsewhere – 
primarily in the US, the world’s leading source of agricultural innovation – to conditions in 
Brazil’s existing agricultural zones (Wilkinson and Sorj 1992).  Overtime, however, EMBRAPA 
increasingly shifted its focus towards domestic innovation, which is what catalyzed Brazil’s 
agricultural expansion.  Its research was directed towards increasing productivity and adapting 
agricultural systems to the distinctive ecosystems of Brazil’s agricultural frontier:  the Amazon, 
the Pantanal, the semi-arid interior, and especially the cerrado (Wilkinson and Sorj 1992).  
Substantial investments were made in the development of novel, science-based technologies for 
tropical environments, including plant genetics and new seed varieties, soil correction and 
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management, and improved agricultural practices adapted to the use of industrial inputs and 
machinery (Martha, Contini and Alves 2013).   
Nature versus Nurture:  The Role of State-Led Innovation 
Brazil faced two significant barriers to expanding its agriculture sector:  a lack of land 
suitable for agriculture (either for growing crops or grazing animals) and an unfavorable climate.  
This assertion may seem surprising.  Brazil is, of course, favored with the world’s fifth largest 
endowment of land, as well as an abundant supply of water.  Of the three factors of production – 
land, labor and capital – Brazil clearly started out with an abundance of the one – land – that 
would be expected to offer a comparative advantage in agriculture.  Yet, in fact, much of its land 
was unfit for commercial agriculture.   
In the late 1960s, more than half of the national territory remained untouched by 
agriculture (Martha, Contini and Alves 2013).  In particular, the vast cerrado region – a 
savannah that stretches for more than 1,000 miles across central Brazil and accounts for 24 
percent of the country’s total area – was considered unsuitable for agriculture due to its acidic 
and infertile soil.  Its Portuguese name denotes “closed, inaccessible land” and, indeed, the 
cerrado was “written off as useless for centuries” (Rohter 2007).  As Martha et al (2013: 207) 
state, “the stock of agricultural technologies and empirical knowledge at that time indicated that 
the agricultural frontier – the ‘Brazilian Cerrado’ – could, at best, accommodate only subsistence 
farming.”  In the words of Norman Borlaug, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning agronomist 
considered the originator of the Green Revolution, “nobody thought these soils were ever going 
to be productive” (cited in Rohter 2007).   
Brazil also faced a second, and equally significant, obstacle.  Most of its landmass is in a 
tropical climate, but tropical climates generally provide acidic, weathered soils of low fertility 
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that cannot sustain the bulk crops grown in temperate climates (Gallup and Sachs 2000).  For this 
reason, it had long been an accepted fact that only temperate regions could effectively and 
efficiently engage in large-scale, intensive agricultural production. 
Crucially, however, technological innovation driven by state-sponsored R&D and related 
policies enabled Brazil to overcome both of these seemingly insurmountable hurdles.  New 
technologies developed by EMBRAPA transformed Brazilian agriculture by turning the cerrado 
into arable and pasturable land and thereby enabling the expansion of commercial agricultural 
production.  In less than a generation, what was once considered a wasteland was transformed 
into one of the most important productive regions of the country, and indeed the world (Horton 
and Borges-Andrade 1999).  Simultaneously, state-directed research carried out by EMBRAPA 
led to the development of new seed varieties and accompanying agricultural practices tailored to 
tropical conditions, thus making possible the emergence of a highly sophisticated and 
competitive agriculture sector in Brazil.  This state-led technological innovation enabled Brazil 
to move away from the tropical products typically exported by developing countries (coffee, tea, 
sugar, bananas, etc.) to producing and exporting commodities (soybeans, cotton, beef, chicken, 
pork, etc.) that directly compete with the world’s dominant agricultural producers – the US, EU, 
and other countries of the Global North.   
From Wasteland to Agricultural Heartland 
The technological innovations developed by EMBRAPA led to a transformation of 
revolutionary proportions in Brazilian agriculture.  It was state-led innovation produced by 
EMBRAPA that enabled both cropland and grazing expansion into the cerrado.  New 
technologies developed by EMBRAPA made it possible to improve soil chemistry and thereby 
turn it into arable land (Rada and Valdes 2012).  The cerrado’s tropical soils are naturally highly 
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acidic, low in fertility (due to a lack of important nutrients such as nitrogen, phosphorus, and 
potassium), and prone to degradation (Huerta and Martin 2002).  In short, left on its own, the soil 
of the cerrado is effectively toxic to agriculture.  To reduce the soil’s toxicity, EMBRAPA 
deployed a technique called agricultural liming, applying massive quantities of lime to the soil to 
lower acidity and neutralize its pH levels, along with phosphorus to improve fertility (Correa and 
Schmidt 2014).  EMBRAPA also developed new varieties of rhizobium, a bacterium that helps 
fix nitrogen in legumes (such as soy), specifically for the cerrado soil, in order to reduce the 
need for fertilizers (Correa and Schmidt 2014).   
EMBRAPA also developed and promoted other important technical solutions to address 
soil conditions in the cerrado, including soil recuperation, “no-till” agriculture, and integrated 
systems of crop production and cattle grazing (Correa and Schmidt 2014).  Due to its fragile 
soils, for example, the cerrado is highly vulnerable to erosion.  EMBRAPA pioneered a system 
of no-till production:  rather than ploughing the soil or harvesting the crop at ground level, it is 
cut high on the stalk and the remains of the plant are left to decompose into a fertile covering of 
organic material, into which the next crop is planted directly, thereby retaining more nutrients in 
the soil (Huerta and Martin 2002).  In 1990, Brazilian farmers used no-till farming for 2.6 
percent of their grains; today that figure is over 50 percent (The Economist 2010). 
At the same time, through its plant breeding programs, EMBRAPA developed more 
productive grass varieties that provided a significant technological breakthrough in creating 
pastureland in the cerrado (Rada and Valdes 2012).  Its scientists, for example, successfully 
adapted the brachiaria species native to savannahs in Africa, which has a high nutritional value, 
provides greater nitrogen fixation and requires less phosphorus fertilization than native pastures.  
They created a variety in Brazil, called braquiarinha, which produces 20-25 tonnes of grass feed 
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per hectare, many times what the native cerrado grasses produce and three times the yield of the 
original variety in Africa.  This meant that parts of the cerrado could be turned into highly-
productive pasture, fueling a massive expansion of Brazil’s beef industry and a dramatic increase 
in its productivity.  The time it took to raise cattle for slaughter Brazil dropped from 4 to 1.5 
years (Correa and Schmidt 2014).  As a result, Brazil’s beef production increased nearly 4 fold 
and it has become the world’s largest beef exporter, supplying 30 percent of the global market 
(Contini and Martha 2010).   
The transformation of the cerrado has been described as “one of the greatest 
achievements of agricultural science in the 20th century” (Rohter 2007).  The cerrado now 
accounts for 70 percent of Brazil’s farm output and is one of the top grain and beef-producing 
regions in the world (Pereira and Neves 2011; Reed 2014).  The expansion of Brazilian 
agriculture into the cerrado had important implications not only for the levels of Brazilian 
production but also its competitiveness.  Brazil’s commercial agriculture, particularly grain 
crops, had previously been concentrated in a relatively small temperate region in the South, 
where supply constraints contributed to high land prices.  Due to the new technologies developed 
by EMBRAPA, producers from that region were able to expand their operations into the cerrado.  
Moreover, since the enormous quantity of land it offered had previously been largely idle, it was 
available cheaply and thus significantly improved the international competitiveness of Brazilian 
producers (Correa and Schmidt 2014). 
Producing Temperate Crops in a Tropical Climate 
The impact of EMBRAPA’s plant breeding programs in adapting temperate crops to 
Brazil’s tropical climate has been equally momentous.  This has been most striking in the case of 
soybeans, which has become the cerrado’s main crop (Goldsmith and Hirsch 2006).  Soybeans 
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are naturally suited to grow in latitudes above 30 degrees, are sensitive to temperature changes 
and require four distinct seasons, and had therefore always been considered a crop only possible 
to grow in temperate climate zones.  All other major soybean producers (such as the US and 
Argentina) have temperate climates, and Brazil itself grew some soy in its temperate Southern 
states.  Through cross-breeding and genetic improvements, however, EMBRAPA created new 
soy cultivars that could grow in tropical climates, with greater tolerance for soil acidity, thereby 
enabling the expansion of soybean production out of the traditional Southern states into the 
cerrado, as well as the arid northeast (Wilkinson and Sorj 1992).  
EMBRAPA also developed new soybean varieties that grow more quickly, with a life 
cycle as much as 12 weeks shorter than normal.  This faster growing period has enabled Brazil to 
operate two full harvests per year, significantly increasing yields and the land productivity of 
Brazil’s soy industry, while providing a marked advantage over traditional producers like the 
US, who are limited to only one annual harvest (Huerta and Martin 2002).  EMBRAPA has 
developed more than 40 tropical varieties of soybeans, including cultivars with greater resistance 
to pests and diseases, reducing crop losses as well as expenditures on insecticides and 
contributing to higher yields (Correa and Schmidt 2014; Rohter 2007).  Inoculating soybean 
seeds with nitrogen-fixing bacteria, described above, has almost eliminated the need for nitrogen 
fertilizers, leading to savings estimated at R$7.5 billion per year (Correa and Schmidt 2014).  
Propelled by these innovations, Brazil now poses a significant competitive challenge to the US, 
which historically dominated world soy markets and accounted for more than 75 percent of 
global exports (Gibson and Benson 2005).  Brazil has become the world’s second largest soy 
exporter, claiming 39 percent of the global market.   
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EMBRAPA has made similarly important technological advances in other crops.  Brazil’s 
cotton sector, for example, had long suffered from low productivity, plant disease, and fierce 
international competition.  That was until EMBPRAPA developed new varieties of cotton 
adapted to tropical conditions, which made it possible to achieve considerably higher yields – 
tripling between 1983 and 2010 – and fiber quality (Correa and Schmidt 2014).  Brazil has since 
become a rapidly-rising cotton producer and is now the world’s fourth largest exporter.  In 
addition, beyond soy and cotton, EMBRAPA has also produced new cultivars for a wide range 
of other species, including rice, wheat, oats, beans and forage (Wilkinson and Castelli 2000). 
The Contributions of State Policies 
Through these innovations, state-sponsored research and development has played a 
fundamental role in expanding Brazil’s agricultural frontier and boosting levels of productivity 
(Wilkinson and Sorj 1992).  Between 1970 and 2010, Brazilian agricultural production more 
than tripled, and it is projected to increase a further 38 percent from 2010 to 2019 (Contini and 
Martha 2010; OECD/FAO 2010).  Productivity gains accounted for approximately 70 percent of 
this growth in output and land area expansion the remainder (Barros 2009).  As Contini and 
Martha (2010: 3) state, “the sector moved fast forward from a traditional to a science-based 
agriculture.”  State-led innovation contributed centrally both to this increase in productivity and 
to the territorial expansion of agriculture, which, combined, simultaneously lowered the overall 
costs and increased the yields of Brazilian agriculture (Rada and Valdes 2012). 
These technological advances have also been supported by other important policy 
measures.  First, EMBRAPA has provided extension services to facilitate rapid diffusion of its 
research discoveries and the adoption of the novel production systems it has developed by 
Brazilian farmers (Rada and Valdes 2012).  Second, the adoption of new technology packages 
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and the expansion of agricultural production into previously idle regions was further stimulated 
by a national system of subsidized credit (Wilkinson and Sorj 1992).  Loans were provided at 
artificially low interest rates, with an extended grace period and low payments that allowed 
producers to keep and reinvest a sizeable portion of their profits.  State-sponsored credit peaked 
in the 1970s, during Brazil’s ISI period, with high rates of rural credit provided by the state at 
heavily subsidized interest rates; yet, although rural credit was reduced substantially with 
structural adjustment in the 1980s and early 1990s, it has risen steadily since then (Contini and 
Martha 2010).  Access to cheap credit played an important role in helping producers gain access 
to and apply the new productive systems that were being developed by EMBRAPA.  It also 
enabled large producers from the Southern states (Rio Grande do Sul, Parana and São Paulo) that 
had constituted the traditional center of commercial agriculture in Brazil to expand their 
operations into the cerrado.   
Brazil’s agricultural revolution has thus been fueled by large and sustained public 
investments in science and technology and associated policies (Rada and Valdes 2012).  It was 
only through extensive state support – for R&D, as well as extension services and subsidized 
financing – that incorporating the cerrado into Brazilian agricultural production, and using that 
land to grow temperate crops, was possible.  Through state-led innovation, Brazil dramatically 
increased its effective agricultural land supply, along with the productivity and global 
competitiveness of its agribusiness sector.   
Brazil’s Resulting Agro-Export Boom 
State intervention originating in the ISI period thus set the stage for the take-off of 
Brazil’s agribusiness sector with economic reform and market opening in the 1990s.  The 
combination of technological innovation and economic liberalization led to explosive growth in 
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Brazilian agricultural production and exports (Wilkinson 2009).  Liberalization generated 
substantial investment, restructuring and consolidation in the sector, spurring rapid and sustained 
export-led growth.  In just a four year period, from 2000-2004, total planted area grew by an area 
larger than the size of Italy or Vietnam (ICONE 2006).  Exports have grown at astounding rates 
as high as 20 percent per year (Valdes 2006).  This growth has been driven by the expansion of 
corporate farming, including the emergence of “mega farms” – large, professionally managed 
corporate farm groups benefitting from massive economies of scale, many with planted areas in 
excess of 1 million hectares.  The agro-industrial sector that has developed in Brazil is among the 
world’s most sophisticated, based on large-scale, mechanized, capital-intensive, vertically-
integrated production (Valdes 2006).   
Brazil has emerged as an agro-industrial powerhouse:  it is one of the most competitive 
agricultural producers in the world and a leading exporter of a large and growing number of 
products (Table 1).  Brazil is now the third largest agricultural exporter, after the US and EU, and 
the country with the largest agricultural trade surplus.3  It is the first country to catch up with the 
traditional “big five” grain exporters (the US, Canada, Australia, Argentina, and the EU).  
Moreover, its exports are expected to continue to expand rapidly over the next decade and 
beyond, and Brazilian producers and officials believe that it could well surpass the US as the 
world’s leading agricultural exporter.4  Brazil has undoubtedly arrived among the world’s “agro-
powers” (Margulis 2014).  Importantly, it is the only tropical country to achieve the status of an 
agricultural superpower; all others have temperate climates.   
Table 1:  Brazil – Selected Agricultural Exports, 2009 
 World Rank Market Share of 
Global Exports (%) 
Projected Growth in 
Next Decade (%) 
3 FAO Data 2011. 




                                                 
Beef 1 30 46 
Poultry 1 39 52 
Sugar 1 45 40 
Ethanol 1 52 155 
Orange Juice 1 86 27 
Coffee 1 32 * 
Soybeans 2 39 33 
Corn 3 10 65 
Pork 4 12 32 
Cotton 4 6 77 
Sources:  AGE/Ministério da Agricultura, Pesca e Abastecimento, USDA. 
* No projections available. 
 
Brazil’s highly-industrialized, export-oriented agriculture sector now plays a major role 
in its economy.  Agribusiness has become a core engine of economic growth, contributing 28 
percent of GDP and over 40 percent of exports (Damico and Nassar 2007; Valdes 2006).    
Agriculture exports make a substantial and essential contribution to Brazil’s trade balance, 
providing a critical means of generating foreign exchange and avoiding the balance-of-payments 
problems that have historically plagued the country.  Agro-exports helped to fuel nearly a decade 
and a half of trade surpluses that enabled the accumulation of $350 billion in foreign reserves,5 
making Brazil a net international creditor for the first time (De Onis 2008).  As one Brazilian 
official stated, “Just look at the figures – my macro[economic] stability depends on 
agribusiness.” 6  Brazil’s economy has slowed significantly since 2010; yet, amidst growing 
economic and political turmoil, agribusiness has remained “an island of prosperity and economic 
dynamism in a national context of losses and lack of investment” (Ioris 2015: 2). 
By fueling strong rates of economic growth, agribusiness contributed to a substantial 
increase in fiscal revenues in the 2000s, which was channeled directly into income transfers to 
the poor (Ban 2012; Barbosa-Filho 2008; Spolador and Roe 2013).  The government raised the 
5 IMF Data. 
6 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
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minimum wage and expanded social welfare policies through programs such as the Bolsa 
Familia, an income transfer to poor households, and Zero Hunger, a program to combat food 
insecurity and extreme poverty.  These policies have succeeded in reducing poverty, especially 
extreme poverty, as well as inequality (Soares, Ribas and Osorio 2007).  The poverty rate has 
fallen from 30 percent in 1990 to 11 percent in 2009 – lifting over 24 million people out of 
poverty – while inequality has fallen from a GINI of 60 in 2001 to 55 in 2009.7  As Antonio Ioris 
(Forthcoming) details, the activity of the contemporary Brazilian state depends on agriculture to 
help manage a substantial public debt and sustain welfare-related programs.   
Brazil’s agribusiness boom has fueled a dramatic expansion of Brazilian firms.  There are 
now approximately 20 Brazilian agribusiness companies with annual sales of more than US$1bn 
and others poised to soon reach this level (Hopewell 2014).  Brazilian firms have diversified 
their activities and moved up the value chain into higher value-added activities, including 
trading, processing, transport, and energy (biofuels).  Many of Brazil’s largest companies have 
globalized their activities and joined the ranks of the world’s leading agribusiness multinationals, 
in part through aggressive campaigns of foreign investment and acquisitions.  JBS, for instance, 
has become the world’s largest meatpacker, with annual revenues of over US$40bn.  JBS 
acquired many of the largest beef, pork and chicken processing companies in the US and Europe 
and now operates 150 plants around the world, with 190,000 employees and exports to 110 
countries.8  BRF-Brasil Foods has emerged as one of the world’s largest processed food 
producers, operating in 110 countries, with $14bn in annual revenues and 130,000 employees.9  
The major Brazilian firms have transformed themselves into global actors, targeting foreign 
7 World Bank Data.   
8 Company data. 
9 Company data. 
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markets and engaged in extensive production and trading activities around the world.  Here too, 
the hand of the Brazilian state is evident, playing a critical role in financing the expansion and 
internationalization of Brazilian agribusiness by supplying low cost loans for investment and 
foreign acquisitions through the National Development Bank (BNDES) (Hochstetler and 
Montero 2013). 
EMBRAPA remains an important force, now operating nearly forty centers and 
employing over 9,000 people, including a research staff of 2,000.  It continues to generate a 
significant and wide-ranging stream of innovations, creating and transferring more than 9,000 
technologies to Brazilian farmers and building a large intellectual property portfolio.  
EMBRAPA also began internationalizing its activities in 1998, providing technical training and 
capacity-building to other developing countries and disseminating its technologies and expertise, 
with a focus on biofuels and tropical agriculture.  In the process, it has become a key element of 
Brazil’s foreign aid policy and efforts to foster South-South cooperation and, consequently, an 
important source of soft power for Brazil (White 2010).  Brazilian political leaders and officials 
celebrate these endeavors as helping other countries in the Global South to achieve economic 
growth and development through agricultural modernization and the fostering of competitive, 
market-oriented agro-export industries, while also improving food security and contributing to 
poverty-reduction.  EMBRAPA currently has cooperative arrangements in place with 56 
countries; it has been particularly active in Africa, where it has projects in 38 countries (Cabral 
and Shankland 2013).  One such initiative, for example, involves transferring and adapting 
Brazil’s successful technologies for boosting cotton yields and quality to the “Cotton-4” 
countries (Mali, Benin, Chad and Burkina Faso), which have been strategically important 
supporters of Brazil’s challenge to US subsidies at the WTO (Alves 2013).  Among the most 
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high-profile initiatives is ProSavana – a project launched in 2011 to transfer and adapt Brazilian 
technology and expertise to Mozambique, where soil and climate conditions are similar (Wolford 
2015).  The project, which is essentially an effort to replicate Brazil’s model of intensive, export-
oriented agriculture in Africa, has been criticized by many civil society organizations (GRAIN 
2013).  Despite such criticism, technical cooperation in agriculture has factored prominently in 
Brazil’s efforts to build alliances and strengthen relations with other developing countries, as part 
of the country’s broader ambitions to increase its status and influence on the international stage. 
Brazil as a New Development Model? 
Brazil has emerged as an agricultural export powerhouse and achieved considerable 
success in reducing poverty.  Yet, the consequences of Brazil’s path of industrialized, export-
oriented agriculture are complex and far from unambiguously positive.  Although the cerrado 
had previously been a wasteland from the perspective of commercial agriculture, it was neither 
vacant nor barren in reality.  While population density was low, the cerrado was home to 
peasants and indigenous peoples and supported rich biodiversity (Machado 2009; Oliveira 2013; 
Pires 2000).  The expansion of Brazilian agribusiness – in the cerrado and elsewhere throughout 
the country – has been accompanied by the (often violent) expulsion of peasants and indigenous 
peoples from the land (Sullivan 2013).  Brazil’s highly unequal land distribution has only been 
exacerbated by economic liberalization and the industrialization of agriculture.  Brazil’s agro-
industrial model has also come with significant environmental impacts, including soil 
degradation, water contamination, air pollution, deforestation, and the loss of biodiversity 
(Rodrigues 2009).  The negative environmental impacts of industrialized agriculture are 
particularly acute in the cerrado, where countering the soil’s natural acidity and raising fertility 
requires the application of massive quantities of industrial fertilizers (Rada 2013).  As a result, 
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there has been extensive criticism from social movements, such as the Landless Workers 
Movement (MST), of the social and environmental costs of Brazil’s intensive commodity-export 
model (IBASE 2015; MST 2009).   
Spurred in part by Brazil’s success, after decades of relative neglect, the World Bank and 
other key development actors are now placing renewed emphasis on agriculture as a source of 
development and poverty reduction (De Janvry 2010; World Bank 2008).  The Bank devoted its 
2008 World Development Report to the subject of “Agriculture for Development,” arguing that 
“it is time to place agriculture afresh at the center of the development agenda.”  The report 
focused considerable attention on Brazil, now widely held up as a model for other developing 
countries to emulate (Margulis 2015).  The World Bank has identified underinvestment in 
agriculture R&D as an instance of “market failure”, thereby legitimating a potential role for 
public investment.  Alongside standard Washington Consensus prescriptions, such as liberalizing 
trade, strengthening property rights, facilitating efficient markets and a favorable investment 
climate, the Bank is now advocating investment to foster technological innovation in agriculture, 
with an emphasis on public-private partnerships and biotechnology.  However, while the World 
Bank (2008: 1) states that “today’s agriculture offers new opportunities to hundreds of millions 
of rural poor to move out of poverty,” there is reason to be skeptical of such claims. 
The Bank and others stress the potential for integrating small-scale agricultural producers 
into global markets (Akram-Lodhi 2008).  But that is far from what has occurred in Brazil:  the 
success of its agribusiness sector has been built on one of the most unequal land structures in the 
world, with just 1.5 percent of rural land owners effectively occupying 53 percent of all 
agricultural lands (Clements and Fernandes 2013).  This extreme land concentration is not 
incidental but essential to its agro-industrial model, with the productivity and competitiveness of 
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Brazilian agribusiness predicated on massive economies of scale and large-scale land holdings.  
To replicate Brazil’s model in most developing countries would require the concentration of land 
holdings through the mass displacements of peasants, with extreme social upheaval and potential 
for injustice, which many contend is occurring across diverse parts of the world in a new “global 
land grab” (Margulis, McKeon and Borras 2013).   
It is also important to recognize that, in the Brazilian case, agricultural exports and 
growth alone were not sufficient for poverty reduction.  Particularly since industrialized 
agriculture is highly capital-intensive, limiting its capacity for direct employment creation, 
redistributive measures were essential to achieving reductions in poverty and hunger in Brazil.  
Any normative appeal of Brazil’s agro-export model is thus heavily contingent on concerted 
redistribution policies by the state.  Given efforts to internationalize the Brazilian experience to 
sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the developing world, this should serve as a cautionary 
note for proponents of schemes like ProSavana and claims that large-scale monoculture farming 
can lead to reductions in hunger and poverty in and of itself.   
Conclusion 
As this paper has shown, Brazil’s newfound position as a dominant agricultural exporter 
was not a simple consequence of nature but the result of interventionist state policies that 
(literally) reengineered its comparative advantage in agriculture.  The remarkable success of 
Brazil’s agro-industrial sector has been based less on its natural factor endowments – which 
were, in fact, highly unconducive to industrialized agriculture – than on science and technology.  
State-driven research and development, and resulting technological advances, backed by 
extension services and subsidized financing, played a critical role in Brazil’s emergence as an 
agro-export powerhouse by expanding its supply of arable and pasturable land, adapting 
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formerly temperate crops to the country’s tropical climate and soils, and significantly increasing 
yields and productivity.  Combined, these factors have dramatically increased Brazil’s 
agricultural production, while reducing the costs and improving the competitiveness of its 
exports, transforming Brazil into a major rival to the world’s leading agricultural exporters, the 
US and EU.  What has occurred in Brazil – the construction of a new comparative advantage in 
industrial and formerly temperate agriculture as a result of state policies – thus defies the 
assumptions of both neoliberalism and developmental state theory.  Far from being planned, 
however, Brazil’s emergence as an agro-power was a largely unintended offshoot of its 
ambitious efforts to industrialize and foster the development of its manufacturing sector during 
the ISI era.   
The “accidental” nature of Brazil’s emergence as an agro-power raises interesting 
questions about the role of intentionality in development and industrial policy.  The defining 
feature of the developmental state is typically seen as the state’s capacity to direct the 
development process and attain its goals (e.g., Weyland 1998); in other words, intentionality – 
the state’s pursuit of a clear and precisely delineated set of objectives – is key.  Yet, the Brazilian 
case is not the only one to challenge this assumption.  Far from following a fixed plan clearly 
laid out from the start, for example, China’s economic development has been based on policy 
experimentation and a trial-and-error approach, and China’s policymakers had little conception 
of how extraordinarily successful its reform program would ultimately become (Whyte 2009).  
Similarly, “pragmatic flexibility” and the use of shifting policy instruments is seen as a hallmark 
of the developments paths of the East Asian NICs (World Bank 1993).  Contingency and 
fortuitous accidents have thus played an important role for other successful developers.  The 
same also holds true for industrial upgrading in advanced economies like the US, where, for 
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instance, state-backed investments in technological innovation driven by military objectives have 
frequently produced positive spill-over effects for the development of commercial technologies 
(Mazzucato 2015; Weiss 2005).  It is the willingness to make investments where payoffs are 
uncertain and the capacity to embrace the fortuitous accidents that occur that appear critical to 
effective industrial policy – as, for example, the Asian tigers did at times when their industrial 
policy followed rather than led the market (Wade 2010), or Brazil has recently done in 
championing its emergent agribusiness multinationals by helping to finance their 
internationalization.  In examining actually-existing industrial policy, the notion of the state as an 
omniscient rational actor, capable of performing cost-benefit calculations to determine whether 
to enter a new industry, by weighing the costs of technological upgrading against the expected 
future returns, falters.  As Chang argues:  
the problem is that it is very difficult to predict how long the acquisition of 
the necessary technological capabilities is going to take and how much 
‘return’ it will bring in the end. … unless you actually enter the industry and 
develop it, it is impossible to know how long it will take for the country to 
acquire the necessary technological capabilities to become internationally 
competitive. (Lin and Chang 2009: 491) 
 
In a world of bounded rationality and fundamental uncertainty, markets, growth and 
development are highly unpredictable, and the impact of innovation is inherently difficult, if not 
impossible, to entirely foresee.  What the Brazilian case illustrates, however, is the remarkable 
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